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BOOK REVIEWS
Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes, by Charles Hartshorne, Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 144.

Reviewed by JOHN E. SMITH, Yale University.
It is often thought that a critical review must of necessity be negative, but this
is a mistake. Jf criticism means, as it should, the passing of judgment then there
is no good reason why such judgment could not be positive, especially if one
is prepared to give reasons for the opinion. Hartshorne has written an excellent
little book, remarkable not only because of its combination of theological,
philosophical and scientific learning with good sense, wit and wisdom, but in
the ground it covers in so short a space as well. What is more, the author succeeds
in presenting clearly some quite complex ideas---God, creation, freedom, evolution, love-and in developing them to a point where they serve to illuminate a
number of immediate problems confronting all of us on the contemporary scenethe nuclear arms race, abortion and pro-life arguments and the debate about
creation "science." The discussion is rooted in Hartshorne's "neoclassical
theism," here presented in the course of proposals for correcting "six common
mistakes about God," stemming in one way or another from what Hartshorne
rightly calls misguided conceptions of what it means to be "Perfect" and "Omnipotent." I detect in this particular version of a position articulated at greater
length in other writings, a stronger tendency than heretofore to bring theological
conceptions in line with biblical insights and to stress some of the limitations
imposed on religious thought by certain notions adopted from Greek philosophy.
Briefly, the theological errors to be avoided are: thinking of God as Absolutely
Perfect and Unchangeable, as Omnipotent and Omniscient in an all or nothing
sense and as the bearer of unsympathetic goodness. Two other mistakes, one
concerning immortality and the other the concept of revelation, are also cited,
but these are said to depend on the status of man and not upon the unique function
of God. No detailed account of Hartshorne's arguments is possible here, but
since the first four mistakes are to be avoided by invoking what Hartshorne calls
the principle of Dual Transcendence we must concentrate on that. Succinctly
stated, this principle is based on the claim, to be found in different ways in both
Hegel and Tillich, that no clear and consistent conception of the relation between
God and the creatures is possible if the two are initially conceived as being
totally "outside" or "other than" each other. In Hartshorne's version, God contrasts with creatures not as an abstract infinite against a finite, but as a concrete
"infinite-and-finite" each aspect of which, in uniquely excellent ways, i.e.,
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beyond rivalry and criticism, contrasts with fragmentary creatures who are neither
relative nor absolute in themselves. Applying this principle to the traditional
view of divine omnipotence results in the disclosure of incoherence, for on that
view God is seen as wholly independent or "absolute" in relation to creatures
who are wholly passive and consequently can do nothing of themselves in any
sense. In claiming that God is both active and passive in relation to creatures,
Hartshorne aims at one stroke to ensure that creatures actually decide and acthave a measure of self-creativity-and to show how this finite creativity makes
a difference or influences God. This conception is Hartshorne's signal contribution and in presenting it he helps to make explicit in a coherent way a most
curious deficiency in Western religious thinking and at the same time to show
how the defect can be overcome. Consider, first, that the biblical view of a
living God is combined with a belief in the reality of history, time, individual
development and novelty. Then consider further that the traditional theological
idea of God as "Perfect," "Absolute," "Pure Actuality" leaves no room either
for a living God or for the real difference that the historical increment, including
the development of individual personalities, makes to the divine life. To
Hartshorne must go the credit for meeting this problem head-on and saying, in
effect, that if the biblical view includes taking seriously the value resident in
the historical increment and the freedom of the creatures, with God's help, to
have a hand in making themselves, then the traditional idea of God-as the One
who is through and through "without a shadow of turning" can no longer be
maintained. This is a major step not only in the direction of logical consistency,
but in the way of conceiving of God as actually involved with the creatures and
not as an abstract "Perfection" to be "honored" by equally abstract and one-sided
predicates-Omnipotent, Omniscient, etc.-which, construed strictly, would
make such involvement impossible.
While I am in complete agreement with Hartshorne's rejection of determinism
along lines marked out by Peirce, James, Whitehead and others, I would like
to enter a word of caution and raise a question about the idea of being "creator
of myself." In introducing this idea (p. 17), Hartshorne cites Lequier's "Thou
has created me creator of myself," Whitehead's reference to "the self-created
creature," and Sartre's idea of human consciousness as self-caused, causa sui.
To begin with, self-creation stands in need of qualification or limitation and I
am reassured that, in a number of places, Hartshorne takes note of the point.
The scope of freedom is said to be limited (p.18); there is the expression "to
some extent self-controlled" (p.36); "to some extent" is repeated in this connection
(p. 79) and "partly self-creative" is also used (p. 81). Well and good, but if such
limitation is recognized, it will not do to place Sartre in the above company
because he, in principle, denies the limits and espouses what I call "free" freedom
in the idea that we can be only insofar as we have our own being solely from

BOOK REVIEWS

439

ourselves---causa sui-and do not have it from another, i.e., God. Sartre's
dismissal of God is not a matter of preference, but is a consequence of his idea
of freedom and total self-creation; man can be only if God is not. I take it,
however, that Hartshorne would not accept this idea of freedom nor that of a
totally self-caused being. My reason for raising this issue is that, while I accept
the idea of limited self-creation, I do not believe that we should overlook the
problem of our having to live with (be responsible for?) those aspects of ourselves
which we did not create but have inherited from beyond our freedom. In short,
there is the question whether an element of fate can ever be eliminated from
finite freedom and whether that element can be reconciled with the idea of divine
providence intended to signal the triumph over the belief in bondage to fate
which was widespread in the world of antiquity.
Hartshorne makes some telling criticisms of the claims made by the adherents
of the pro-life position on abortion, of the view that the theory of evolution is
incompatible with divine creation, and of those fundamentalists in religion who
would force essentially ignorant beliefs upon us through legislative means. In
describing pro-life literature as full of "question begging," Hartshorne points to
the confusion of the actual and the possible. The fetus, he rightly insists, has to
be understood in terms of what it actually is, i.e., something very different from
what it may become. It is, he argues, to beg the question when it is assumed
that the difference is irrelevant. "It is not a mere opinion," he writes, "that there
are enormous .. .differences between a fetus and an adult human being ... " (p.
100), and to ignore them is simply to ignore basic facts. Under the rubric of
"Creation through Evolution," Hartshorne presents a convincing case for the
thesis that not only is the process of evolution consistent with the reality of a
God whose creatures are endowed with freedom, but that the process requires
God for its intelligibility as well. "The evolutionary scheme," he writes, "presupposes an aspect of order in the world which it does not explain" (p. 71) and
which cannqt be accounted for by mutual adaptation among the creatures. The
order necessary for there to be a world at all requires in tum an orderer. Here
Hartshorne agrees with Whitehead and with Peirce in some writings.
Finally, Hartshorne alerts us to the dangers that exist in the political power
possessed by proponents of fundamentalistic religion with their alternative "Creation biology or else a Godless biology" (p. 116). As he says, this alternative
is ignorant and might be harmless were it not for the fact that those who believe
it have a fanatic belief in the possibility of forcing it upon us through the power
of the law.
While it is not possible to do justice to all that is in this book in a short review,
I commend it to thoughtful readers who still value intelligence in religion.

